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Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.




 Licensing patented technology plays a dual role in technological advancement: 
it enables patent owners as licensors to be compensated for their inventions, while 
simultaneously allowing licensees to make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import into 
the United States a product or process covered by a patent.1  In fact, licensing 
has allowed nations to rebuild, modernize, and gain superiority in a field.2 
However, negotiating a successful license can be a difficult, often laborious task.3 
Potential licensors, particularly small, innovative companies, experience a va-
riety of obstacles when negotiating a license.4  But what would happen if almost 
any licensing attempt—no matter how slight—puts a willing licensor at immi-
nent risk of a declaratory judgment action by a potential licensee?  How would 
the balance of power shift between the willing licensor and the potential licensee?
 In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., the Federal Circuit, in a case of first 
impression, examined whether there was an actual controversy for the purpose of 
maintaining subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action for patent 
invalidity and non-infringement.5  A recent Supreme Court decision, MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,6 called into question the Federal Circuit’s test for deter-
mining the existence of an actual controversy in such an instance.7  In response to 
1. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 
151 (2006) [hereinafter OECD].  An entity is liable for infringement of a patent if, “without authority 
[it] makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into 
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
2. See Licensing Best Practices: The LESI Guide to Strategic Issues and Contemporary 
Realities 4 (Robert Goldscheider ed., 2002) [hereinafter Licensing Best Practices].  Take for 
example, Japan:
   After World War II, licensing was extensively and effectively used by Japan to 
rebuild its industry, and develop dominance in fields such as consumer electronics and 
optics.  It was also used to modernize Japan’s chemical, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical 
industries.  Japan was and is still running a large deficit in technology-related balance of 
payment, but its strategy of extensive licensing allowed it to jump start the country rebuild-
ing, and in the case of consumer electronics, to dominate worldwide markets with its 
innovations.
 Id.
3. See Vernon Parker, Negotiating Licensing Agreements, in International Business Negotiations 243, 
250–54 (Pervez N. Ghauri & Jean-Claude Usunier eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing the many elements 
and considerations required to successfully negotiate a patent license).
4. See id.
5. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  The court 
quotes the Declaratory Judgment Act, which in relevant part reads: 
  In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, 
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations 
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought.
 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000)).  In a typical declaratory judgment action regarding a patent 
dispute, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed 
upon by the plaintiff ’s products or processes.
6. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (holding that a non-repudiating patent licensee can seek a declaratory judgment 
action against a licensor while the license is still in force).
7. Id. at 774 n.11.
353
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
MedImmune, the Federal Circuit abandoned its old test and proffered a new one.8 
This case comment contends that the SanDisk court’s new legal test improperly ap-
plied Supreme Court precedent by placing overly strict limitations on the district 
court’s discretionary power.  The SanDisk test results in the impractical effect of 
putting any willing licensor at risk of a declaratory judgment action for taking a nec-
essarily adverse position—no matter how slight—against a potential licensee.
 Plaintiff SanDisk is a major player in the f lash memory storage market.9 
Defendant STMicroelectronics (“ST”) entered into the market more recently.10  Both 
companies own multiple patents in the f lash memory storage field.11  In April 2004, 
ST sent a letter to SanDisk listing several ST patents that “may be of interest” to 
SanDisk and requested a meeting to discuss a patent cross-licensing agreement.12 
SanDisk responded that it would need several weeks to review the patents and that it 
would be in touch about a potential meeting in June 2004.13  In July 2004, with 
SanDisk yet to respond, ST sent a follow-up letter, which again requested a meeting 
to discuss cross-licensing.14  The July letter listed additional ST patents that “may 
also be of interest.”15  SanDisk replied that it wished to continue the “friendly discus-
sions” between the companies’ business representatives about ST selling SanDisk 
certain f lash memory products.16  Notably, the business representatives had not yet 
discussed any patents or a potential cross-licensing agreement.17
 In August 2004, SanDisk and ST met to discuss cross-licensing.18  As part of 
their negotiating strategies, SanDisk and ST presented detailed infringement anal-
yses to explain why they believed the other party was liable for infringement.19  ST 
also presented an economic analysis that included both companies’ revenues and re-
search and development costs, as well as the costs of SanDisk’s allegedly unlicensed 
actions.20  Upon conclusion of the meeting, ST presented SanDisk with a packet of 
8. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
9. Id. at 1374.
10. Id.
11. Id.  ST’s patents-at-issue include U.S. Patent Nos. 4,839,768; 5,073,816; 5,175,706; 5,455,954; 5,589,762; 
5,636,115; 5,793,679; 5,831,302; 5,999,456; 6,100,581; 6,163,487; 35,121; 5,014,312; and 5,438,504. 
SanDisk’s patent-at-issue is U.S. Patent No. 5,172,338.
12. Id.  A cross-license is defined as “an agreement between two or more patentees to exchange licenses for 




15. Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. Id.
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materials, including ST’s infringement analysis.21  ST told SanDisk that it knew 
these materials would provide SanDisk with a basis to seek and sustain a declaratory 
judgment action against ST, but that ST had “absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue 
SanDisk.”22  SanDisk replied that it also had no plans to sue ST and that another 
meeting might be appropriate.23
 On September 3, 2004, upon ST’s request, SanDisk sent a copy of its presenta-
tion.24  On September 15, 2004, SanDisk sent ST a confidential version of SanDisk’s 
cross-licensing offer, which would expire on September 27, 2004.25  ST requested a 
non-confidential version of the offer, but SanDisk refused.26
 On October 15, 2004, after a series of communications attempting to set up an-
other meeting, SanDisk filed suit, seeking a “declaratory judgment of noninfringement 
and invalidity of the fourteen ST patents that had been discussed during the crossli-
censing negotiations.”27  ST moved to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, claiming that there was no actual controversy at the time of filing.28  ST 
based this assertion on the ground that “SanDisk did not have an objectively reason-
able apprehension of suit, even though it may have subjectively believed that ST 
would bring an infringement suit.”29
 The District Court for the Northern District of California, relying on the Federal 
Circuit’s then-valid “reasonable apprehension” test, dismissed the complaint finding 
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.30  The “reasonable apprehension” test re-
quires “an explicit threat or other action by the patentee which creates a reasonable 
apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an 
infringement suit.”31  The district court found that no actual controversy existed as 
SanDisk failed to show a “reasonable apprehension” that ST would file an infringe-
ment suit at the time SanDisk filed its complaint.32  Alternatively, the district court 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1375–76.






29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44870, *32–33 
(N.D. Cal. 2005).  The “reasonable apprehension” test was utilized to determine if an actual controversy 
existed at the time of filing for the purposes of maintaining subject matter jurisdiction over a declara-
tory judgment action.  See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1376.
31. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Gen-Probe Inc. v. 
Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 
852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
32. SanDisk, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *32–33.
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stated “that even if it had subject matter jurisdiction over the instant claims, it would 
exercise its discretion and decline to decide them.”33
 SanDisk appealed the district court’s decision.34  In the interim, the Supreme 
Court decided MedImmune on January 9, 2007.35  MedImmune considered the narrow 
issue of whether a non-repudiating patent licensee can seek a declaratory judgment 
action against a licensor while the license is still in force.36  The Supreme Court, in 
a footnote, called into question the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension” test, 
stating that it was at odds with its precedent.37 
 The Federal Circuit, relying on MedImmune, abandoned the “reasonable appre-
hension” test and reversed.38  In place of the “reasonable apprehension” test, the 
Federal Circuit proffered a new legal test: “where a patentee asserts rights under a 
patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and 
where the party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity 
without a license, an Article III case or controversy will arise . . . .”39  In such an 
instance, “the party [contending that a license is unnecessary] need not risk a suit for 
infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its 
legal rights.”40
 The Federal Circuit found that ST’s ongoing assertions that SanDisk infringed 
certain ST patents, including presentation of a detailed infringement analysis and 
royalty assertions, coupled with SanDisk’s denial that it needed to take a license, 
established an Article III case or controversy and thus declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion.41  It concluded that ST’s promise not to sue did not negate the actual controversy 
because ST’s conduct demonstrated a “preparedness and willingness to enforce its 
patent rights.”42  The court described ST’s actions as “the kinds of ‘extra-judicial 
33. Id. at *33 n.30.
34. SanDisk, 408 F.3d at 1374.
35. See 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
36. Id. at 767.
37. Id. at 774 n.11.  The Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension” test as 
being at odds with Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil 
Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941), Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), and Cardinal Chemical Co. 
v. Morton Int’ l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).  Id.
38. SanDisk, 480 F.3d. at 1383.  In order to determine the existence of an actual controversy, the Federal 
Circuit developed a two-part inquiry.  Teva, 395 F.3d at 1332 (citing EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 
F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  The first part is the “reasonable apprehension” test.  Id. at 1332.  The sec-
ond part requires “present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff which could constitute 
infringement, or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity.”  Id. at 1332 (citing Gen-
Probe, 359 F.3d at 1380; Amana Refrigeration, 172 F.3d at 855; BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978).  The court in 
SanDisk left “to another day” the effect that MedImmune had, if any, on the second part.  480 F.3d at 
1380.
39. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. See id. at 1382.
42. Id. at 1382–83.
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patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics’ that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act was intended to obviate.”43
 Judge Bryson concurred in the result, but called into question the court’s new 
legal test, particularly with respect to its practical application.44  Indeed, according to 
Judge Bryson:
it would appear that under the court’s standard virtually any invitation to 
take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee’s activities would give 
rise to an Article III case or controversy if the prospective licensee elects to 
assert that its conduct does not fall within the scope of the patent.45
He continued, “as the court makes clear, even a representation by the patentee that it 
does not propose to file suit against the prospective licensee will not suffice to avoid 
the risk that the patentee will face a declaratory judgment action.”46  Furthermore, 
Judge Bryson questioned the Federal Circuit limiting the district court on remand to 
consider only “‘additional facts’ not previously before the district court.”47
 The Federal Circuit’s legal test proffered in SanDisk improperly applied the 
MedImmune decision and may have a far-reaching impact on licensing negotiations. 
Under the court’s test, all that is necessary to satisfy the Article III case or contro-
versy threshold is a patent owner’s contact with a potential licensee and an offer of a 
license, and the potential licensee’s assertion that it does not need a license.48  In 
practice, this means that essentially any contact with a potential licensee will give 
rise to an actual controversy: the potential licensee will be able to seek a declaratory 
judgment action for patent invalidity, unenforceability, and/or non-infringement.49
 Given the Supreme Court’s criticism, the Federal Circuit correctly abandoned its 
“reasonable apprehension” test.50  However, the new test advanced by the Federal 
Circuit inappropriately results in a potential licensee being able to seek declaratory 
judgment relief for any necessarily adverse position taken by the patent owner, no 
matter how slight.51  Notably, the Supreme Court left “the equitable, prudential, and 
policy arguments in favor of such a discretionary dismissal for the [district] courts’ 
consideration.”52  The practical effect of the new test proffered by the Federal Circuit 
43. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Arrow Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc. 846 F.2d 731, 735 
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
44. Id. at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
45.  Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1385.
48. See id. at 1381 (majority opinion).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 1380 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of [the 
Federal Circuit’s] reasonable apprehension of suit test”).
51. See id. at 1380–81.
52. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.
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in SanDisk is that it, inter alia, severely limits such discretionary dismissal.53  This is 
contrary to MedImmune, which stated that the district court should be given liberal 
discretion to consider various arguments favoring dismissal.54
 If the district court finds that a patent owner alleged another party infringed a 
patent, the patent owner offered a license to cure the infringement, and the party 
denied that it needed a license, then an actual controversy exists for the purposes of 
declaratory action jurisdiction.55  Furthermore, it appears that very little will negate 
such a finding.  Take, for example, an agreement not to sue—such as the one be-
tween SanDisk and ST.  This agreement not to sue, according to the court, does not 
negate the ability to seek relief pursuant to a declaratory judgment action.56
 Moreover, a district court can arguably no longer use its discretion to consider 
whether such an agreement eliminates an actual controversy giving rise to subject 
matter jurisdiction for the purpose of maintaining a declaratory judgment action.57 
The district court can only consider whether the patent owner engaged in conduct 
that showed a willingness to enforce its patents, regardless of whether there was an 
affirmative promise, mutually agreed upon by the parties, not to sue.58  This is in-
consistent with MedImmune, which continues to mandate liberal discretion to 
consider “any merit-based arguments for denial of declaratory relief.”59  Certainly, a 
promise not to sue falls into such a category and the district court, under its discre-
tion, should be allowed to consider such a promise, together with all the surrounding 
circumstances.60  After all, an Article III case or controversy arises when, “under all 
the circumstances . . . there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse 
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a de-
claratory judgment.”61
 In the matter at hand, the SanDisk court summarily limited the district court’s 
discretion on remand to consider all the circumstances.62  It is irrelevant that the 
district court’s decision was prior to MedImmune.  Rather, the only relevant factor is 
that by limiting the district court on remand to consider only the additional facts, the 
53. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1383.
54. See MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 776.  The Declaratory Judgment Act “‘confer[s] on federal courts unique 
and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.’”  Id.  (quoting Wilton v. 
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)).
55. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381, 1383.
56. See id. at 1382–83.
57. Id. at 1383.
58. Id.
59. MedImmune, 127 S.Ct. at 777 (emphasis added).
60. See id. at 776–77.
61. Id. at 771 (citing Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U.S. at 273) (emphasis added).
62. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1383 (limiting the district court on remand to consider only “additional facts” 
not initially considered).
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Federal Circuit improperly applied the Supreme Court’s precedent articulated in, for 
example, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.63
 In Maryland Casualty, the plaintiff, an insurance company, sought a declaratory 
judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify the insured or defend an action 
brought against the insured stemming from an automobile collision.64  The Supreme 
Court found that an actual controversy existed and stated that “[t]he difference be-
tween an abstract question and a ‘controversy’ contemplated by the Declaratory 
Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be 
possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such 
a controversy.”65  The Federal Circuit in SanDisk did exactly what the Supreme Court 
warned against: it proffered a precise, legal test whereby an adverse position—no 
matter how slight or “abstract”—gives rise to an actual controversy.66
 Essentially, the only way for a patent owner to avoid the risk of a declaratory 
judgment action is to enter into an appropriate confidentiality agreement.67  However, 
as Judge Bryson articulated in his concurrence, confidentiality agreements are im-
practical; only a party not interested in seeking a declaratory judgment in the first 
place would enter into such an agreement.68  It is further impractical, in no small 
part, because it impedes the primary purpose of the negotiations—to enter into a 
mutually beneficial patent licensing agreement—by adding another agreement to be 
discussed, disputed, and potentially agreed upon.69  Such an additional agreement 
may hinder or altogether halt negotiations.
 Although the court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit’s test 
places almost no outer bound on the necessary threshold to maintain a declaratory 
judgment action.70  Without an appropriate outer bound, the district court will not 
be able to consider important factors, including equitable, prudential, and policy ar-
guments.  No longer can a patent owner enter into a negotiation without risking 
potentially costly litigation, regardless of whether the owner has an actual intent to 
enforce its patents through litigation.71  If a patent owner approaches a potential li-
censee, it risks a declaratory judgment action.72  This appears to be true regardless of 
63. See Maryland Casualty, 312 U.S. 270.
64. Id. at 271.
65. Id. at 273.
66. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
67. See id. at 1375.
68. See id. at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
69. See Parker, supra note 3, at 243, 250–54 (discussing the many elements and considerations required to 
successfully negotiate a patent license before the SanDisk decision).
70. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 1381 (majority opinion) (noting that licensing negotiations will not be able to occur without 
risking litigation); see also id. at 1383 (noting that the lack of intent to litigate is irrelevant to the issue of 
Article III cases and controversies); Licensing Best Practices, supra note 2, at 314 (discussing the 
high cost of litigation).
72. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
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whether or not it has conducted the proper due diligence necessary to adequately 
sustain and answer questions from the potential licensee about infringement, va-
lidity, and royalties due (i.e., answers necessary for a typical potential licensee to 
entertain a license).73  Conversely, if the patent owner chooses not to approach the 
licensee, its only hope of being compensated for its invention is to sue for infringe-
ment.
 This in turn will impact patent owners, particularly start-ups and small research-
oriented technology companies, by limiting their ability to reap the rewards for their 
inventions in a cost effective way.74  Licensing patents can be an effective means for 
transferring and pooling technology, thereby enabling companies to more success-
fully innovate.  Such patents further ensure that companies are adequately 
compensated for their innovations.75  In contrast, large, well-funded companies will 
be incentivized to seek a declaratory judgment action against patent owners in order 
to gain a competitive advantage in licensing negotiations.76
 Moreover, the new test may encourage patent owners to sue first and ask ques-
tions later.  The new test discourages patent owners from entering into licensing 
negotiations in the first place and instead, will increase a potential licensee’s ability 
to seek relief from the court regardless of whether the patent owner has an intention 
to sue.77  From a patent owner’s perspective, there is an increased fear of creating an 
actual controversy under the court’s new standard.78  The new test places extreme 
restrictions on a patent owner’s ability to approach a potential licensee outside a court 
setting.79  From a potential licensee’s perspective, there is a reduced incentive to ne-
gotiate—it gives a potential licensee an incentive to file a declaratory judgment action 
to better position itself in a licensing negotiation.80  With the increased potential and 
new advantages of entering into litigation—either by the patent owner filing an in-
fringement suit or the potential licensee filing a declaratory judgment action—an 
73. See id. at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
74. See OECD, supra note 1, at 154–56.
75. See id. at 154–55 (discussing the ability of licensing to positively impact innovation networks and 
economic value chains).
76. Notably, the new test is skewed toward potential licensees.  Often, innovation-based companies—such 
as start-ups—place a considerable amount of significance on patents and the ability to effectively reap 
the benefits from their inventions.  See John T. Pienkos, The Patent Guidebook 26 (2005).  By 
increasing the ability for a potential licensee to seek a declaratory judgment action, it makes licensing 
more difficult for these innovation-based companies.  See, e.g., Parker, supra note 3, at 250–54.
77. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381–83.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Leonard T. Nuara, Software Litigation & Software Licensing: Draw or Draft?, in Patents, 
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 811, 811–30 
(Practising Law Institute 2004) (discussing rationale for licensing and litigating).
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already over-burdened court system will find itself with additional, yet potentially 
unnecessary, lawsuits.81
 The SanDisk court’s new test for determining the existence of an Article III case 
or controversy is an overly broad application of MedImmune.  The new test is imprac-
tical and could make licensing negotiations a thing of the past.  The patent system is 
in place to advance, not hinder, technological innovation.  Licensing plays an essen-
tial role in this system.  A narrower test—one that appropriately articulates 
MedImmune and leaves the district court with the requisite amount of discretion to 
consider all the circumstances—should be employed. 
81. See Licensing Best Practices, supra note 2, at 314 (discussing the expenses of litigating and the 
inefficiency of and burden on the court system); Nuara, supra note 80, at 823–24, 829 (discussing 
litigation costs).  The time to trial in patent cases typically takes several years.  For example, the average 
time to trial in patent cases in the Southern District of New York is 44.4 months.  Choosing a Patent 
Litigation Venue, 3rd Patent Strategies Conference (Affinia Manhattan Hotel, New York, N.Y.) 
Mar. 30, 2007, at 4.  This does not take into account potential appeals.  While the litigation is pending, 
there is an uncertainty as to the outcome, which could also have adverse effects on a company.  See 
Nuara, supra note 80, at 822–24.
